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In tlte StipreDie Cotirt of the
State of Utah

FLORENCE BUCKLEY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

CASE
NO. 7730

STANLEY COX and ALICE T. C'OX,
his wife, and KARL COX,
Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

The brief of respondent seems to be based on the theory
that if there is evidence in the record from which the court
might find for the plaintiff, the judgment can be sustained.
The appellants concede that if the testimony of plaintiff can
be disregarded that there is evidence to sustain · the judgment of the trial court. The question is - ·CAN THE
COURT DISREGARD THE TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF,
WHEN SHE ADMITS ALL THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF ADVERSE USER IN THE DEF1ENDANTS,
AND GRANT JUDG~.1:ENT IN I-IER FAVOR?
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FURTHER STATEMENT
The plaintiff, in addition to what is quoted in the original brief of appellants, testified to the following:
"'Over the years since the Coxes have been there
do you know of any use they made of the driveway,
other than to bring in coal and a few things?
A. No, I don't." (Tr. p. 161)
"And at that time this question, on page 15, was
asked: 'Q. But more so the last two years.
A. He has taken it over the last two years, it
doesn't belong to us any more.
Q. But before that he used it?
A. He used it whenever he wanted, we didn't say
anything to him.'" (Tr. p. 162)
Again on page 163 appears the following:
"Q. At:Jd on page 16 you answered to a question
as follows:
'Yes, of course after Mr. Cox got his road on the
north then I thought that would relieve us, he wouldn't
have to have two roads into his place, you know.
Q. But he continued even after that?
A. Yes, he continued to use it.
Q. And claimed the right to use it?
A. And claimed the right to use it.--(Balance
stricken)'
Q. Did you so testify?
A. I did."

It might also be mentioned that Mr. Ernest F. Buckley
testified as follows on direct examination for plaintiff:
''Do you remember when this trouble began?
A. Well it began here abqut, oh, couple of years
ago I guess when this young Cox got his car, and when
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he drove my sister's roomers out of there and told them
to get out of the driveway.
Q. Before that time had there ever been any trouble with the Coxes about what little use they made of
the driveway?
A. They never had any trouble because they
never used the road any more than just probably to
get back and forth. But I don't ever remember them
using the road to haul any of that stuff up in there that
they claim." (Tr. p. 152)
ARGUMENT
Plaintiff's own testimony established adverse user by
appellants.
The appellants believe that the great preponderance of
the testimony is that the use they have made of the driveway was open and notorious, but that it is not necessary to
prove that to bring the claim of adverse right to the attention of plaintiff. Plaintiff's own testimony conclusively
proves that she had actual notice of the adverse claim of
appellants and of their use of the driveway, and with such
knowledge she consented to the use of the driveway for
more than 20 years without objection. Plaintiff testified
that she had asked Cox many times not to use the driveway, but he claimed the right to use it at all times since he
came there in 1927 like it was his road, and like she didn't
have any claim to it at all. (Tr. 26-28) She was asked:
"Q. You testified on your deposition that Mr. Cox had always claimed the right to use of the driveway since he had
been there? A. Yes, he has." (Tr. 30)
The purpose of open and notorious possession is to give
notice to the owner. The case of Downie vs. City of RenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ton, 162 Wash. '181, 9 P(2) 372, at page 374 of the Pacific
Report, states it as follows:
"-·-To ·acquire an easement by prescription the
owner must know of and acquiesce in the adverse user,
or the use must be so open, notorious, visible and uninterrupted that knowledge and acquiescence will be
presumed.''
Later on the same page appears the following quotation:
"The words 'open and notorious possession,' asapplied to the adverse holding of land by· another, mean
that the disseisor's claim of ownership must be evidenced by such acts and conduct as are sufficient to
put a man of ordinary prudence on notice of the fact
that the land in question is held by the claimant as his
own * * * It is, therefore, essential in all cases
that the owner shall have notice to that effect. If he
has actual notice that will, of course, be sufficient in
itself. Where, however, there has been no actual notice,
. it is necessary to show that the possession of the disseisor was so open, notorious, and visible, as to warrant the inference that the owner must, or should, have
known it; othewise a mere trespass might be evidence
of ouster.' 1 R. C. L. 14, pp. 700,701."
Appellants have no contention with the law submitted
in the brief of respondent, but it simply does no add up to
a- judgment for the plaintiff. Here we have the plaintiff
herself admitting all the essential elements of adverse use
and this is the substance of her testimony and not mere
parts of it. She never did deny the essential parts, and no
one could make that denial for her It is respectfully sub-
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mited that on the record appellants are entitled to judgment.
Respectfully submited,
J. C. HALBERSLEBEN,
Attorney for Appellants
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